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Introduction 
• The purpose of this presentation is to present 
some perliminary results of this ongoing 
research project, 
• To compare and contrast budgetary oversight 
in Francophone countries with the oversight 
practiced by PAC 
Preliminary remarks 
• The literature on oversight has shown that 
oversight is good in many respects 
• Oversight improves the quality of democrcay 
• It increases the legitimacy of the policies and of 
the political system 
• It increases the stability of political system 
• It reduces the risk and the incidence of political 
violence 
• It reduces corruption 
Preliminary remarks-2 
• Given the importance of oversight, considerable 
attention has been paid to how parliaments 
perform the oversight function 
• to distribution and the ‘bite’ of the oversight 
tools, 
• To the conditions under which legislatures are 
more effectively performing their oversight tasks, 
• To what can be overseen 
• And to how the expenditure of public money can 
be monitored/overseen by a legislature 
Preliminary remarks-3 
• In the wake of the publication of McGee 
(2002), considerable attention has been paid 
to PACs 
• Evidence has generally argued that PAC 
success may depend on 
– Institutionalization, 
– Organizational features 
Preliminary remarks-4 
• Institutionalization refers to either: 
– The type of norms under which a PAC is set up 
and operates, 
– The mandate of PACs 
Preliminary remarks-5 
• Organizational features refer to 
• Type of legislature 
• Size of legislature 
• Size of committee 
• Percentage of opposition members on the PAC 
• Opposition chair 
• Number of staff at the disposal of the PAC 
Preliminary remarks-6 
• Broader mandate 
• Bigger size 
• Better representation of opposition 
• Opposition chair 
• Larger staff 
• Are all believed to enhance the performance 
of a PAC 
A comparative analysis 
• The data at our disposal reveal that there are 
differences and similarities within types of system 
and across types of systems 
• The parliaments with a PAC (Thailand and 
Indonesia) are  both bicameral, while 2 of the 3 
Francophone parliaments (Vietnam and Laos) 
while the third one (Cambodia) is bicameral 
• PACs are all chaired by an opposition MP, while 
the committees in Francophone countries are all 
chaired by government members 
A comparative analysis-2 
• The case of Cambodia is quite different from 
all the other cases. 
• The functions that are performed by PACs in 
Thailand and Indonesia or taht are performed 
by a single committee in Laos and Vietnam, 
are performed by 2 committees: 
– la commission de l’économie, des finances, de la 
banque et de l’audit in the Senate; 
– la commission des finances et de la banque 
Institutionalization 
• No information for LAOS 
• Thailand: Parliamentary rules  
• Indonesia and Vietnam: law 
• Cambodia: constitution and rules (art. 15 of 
the rules of the senate and art. 6 of the rules 
of the assembly) 
• This means that parliamentary rules are the 
most common way in which a PAC or its 
functional equivalent are institutionalized 
 
Size 
• The general conclusion is: PACs are generally smaller, while budget committees are 
generally bigger 
• There is however a major exception to this general trend 
• In Cambodia Senate committees have 5 members, while committees in the 
national assembly have 7 members 
• Cambodian committees are the smallest,  
• PACs are relatively small-sized 
• (there are 9 members in the Indonesian PAC, and there are 15 members in the 
THAI PAC) 
• While committees are bigger in Laos and Vietnam 
• Laos: 31 members 
• Vietnam:37 members 
 
• McGee suggested that when legislatures are too small and/or when PACs are too 
small, their smallness may have a detrimental impact on the functioning of the 
committee 
Size-2 
• One has to wonder however about whether 
past a certain point large committee size may 
also become problematic, 
• For instance by creating the conditions for 
collective action problems. 
Opposition MPs 
• The committees under study differ not only in 
terms of size but also and more importantly in 
terms of their partisan composition 
• There are no opposition MPs in Vietnam and 
Cambodia 
• 1/3 of the MPs serving on the PAC come from the 
opposition in Indonesia 
• Nearly half (7/15) PAC members are from the 
opposition in Thailand 
• And no information was provided by Laos 
Opposition MPs-2 
• The literature on PACs has shown that PACs 
work better when some PAC members are 
from the opposition 
• When opposition is adequately represented 
there is no need to have an opposition chair 
• An opposition chair is however essential when 
opposition parties are not adequately 
represented or, worse, not represented at all 
Length of term 
• While these committees differ from one 
another in terms of size and parisan 
composition, they display no difference in 
terms of the length/duration of the mandate. 
• They all last for the full term 
• In the Cambodian case, the term in the 
Assembly is one year longer than the term in 
the Senate 
Opposition Chair 
• We find opposition chairs for the PACs (Indonesia, 
Thailand) 
• We find govenment chairs for the Francophone 
countries (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam) 
• The literature on PACs has repeatedly shown that 
in those countries where the government party 
controls an overwhelming majority of the seats, it 
is beneficial for the proper functioning of the 
committee to have an Opposition Chair 
Staff 
• Staff matters 
• Bigger staff usually leads to the production of 
more reports 
• And the production of more reports goes 
hand in hand with the ability to reduce the 
misallocation of resources, the promotion of 
good governance and the reduction of 
corruption 
Staff-2 
• If we only look at dedicated staff, PACs in the 
region enjoy the support of remarkably 
smaller staff 
• 9 staff members in Thailand, 10 members in 
Indonesia 
• While in Laos and Vietnam budgetary 
oversight committees have remarkably larger 
staff 
• 24 in Laos, 37 in Vietnam 
Staff-3 
• The exception of course to this trend (small 
staff for PAC, big staff for committees in 
Francophone legisature) is represented by 
Cambodia, 
• Cambodia has a 5-member staff 
• The literature on PACs (Stapenhurst, Pelizzo, 
Jacobs, 2013) has shown that the size of staff 
at the disposal of a PAC reflects the size of the 
committee 
Staff-4 
• The trend that comparative analysis has 
detected globally remains valid in the south 
East Asian region: 
• Even in SEA bigger committees have more 
staff at their disposal and, smaller committees 
rely on a smaller staff 
Staff-5 
• However, the difference is less remarkable if 
we look at the size of total staff 
(dedicated+non dedicated) 
• For instance, if we look at total staff Indonesia 
has 10 (dedicated)+20 (non-dedicated, 
provided by the government) staff members, 
for a total of 30 staff members 
• A value that is failry close to the values 
recorded in Laos and Vietnam 
Staff-6 
• It is important to note that while the 
relationship between the size of the 
committee and the size of staff is true globally 
and is also true in the region, regional 
committees all have a larger size at their 
disposal than the average PAC. 
• The smallest staff size in the region 
(Cambodia) is of 5 member, while the average 
staff size for a PAC is 3.3 members 
activities 
• Activities are usually tracked by looking at 
• Number of meetings 
• Number of hearings 
• Number of completed inquiries 
• Number of reports submitted 
Activities-2 
• Responses have not been provided by all 
respondents in all respects 
• So the only category for which we can make 
some comparison concerns the number of 
meetings 
Activities-3 
• With regard to the number of meetings, 
• Laos provided no information 
• Vietnam held 10, 12 and 12 meetings in 2010, 
2011 and 2012. 
• Cambodia held 16 and 13 meetings in 2011 and 
2012 
• Thailand held about 50 meetings a year 
• While Indonesia reported to be holding 2 
meetings a week 
Activities-4 
• These data show that PAC meet more 
frequently 
• Since PACs have more opposition members 
than the corresponding Cambodian, Laotian 
and Vietnamese counterparts, 
• The SEA data sustain the claim that the 
frequency or number of meetings reflects the 
number of opposition members serving on the 
PAC or its functional equivalent 
Activities-5 
• The data from SEA further illustrate that the smaller 
Cambodian committee are more active than the larger 
Laotian and Vietnamese committee 
• This findings sustains a claimed we advanced earlier 
on, namely that size may matter in more ways than 
McGee had anticipated 
• Supersmall PACs/committees may underperform 
because of their smallness, but oversized committees 
may also underperform because they have more 
coordination and collective action problems 
Activities-6 
• And the collective action problems that bigger 
committees may experience are not solved or 
counterbalanced, in contrast to what McGee 
had claimed, by the presence of a larger staff. 
• The evidence from SEA suggests that McGee’s 
hypothesis on the relation between size and 
performance needs to be reconsidered  
Activities-7 
• For McGee small PAC fail to perform because 
they are small, while big PAC fail to perfom when 
they are inadequately staffed 
• We claim, small PAC fail to perform because they 
are small and inadequately staffed, while big PAC 
fail because of internal coordination problems 
that have nothing to do with the size of staff 
• The best committee is medium-sized and 
properly staffed 
